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Abstract  
Social engineering exploits vulnerabilities at different layers (i.e. technical, social layer) in an 
organizational defense structure. It is therefore important to understand how to defend against 
these attacks using a holistic defense approach including multiple countermeasures. The 
literature suggests a plethora of countermeasures, little research has however been done to assess 
their effectiveness in managing social engineering threats. In this paper we attempt to obtain a 
deeper understanding of how to defend against a type of social engineering attack that attempts 
to install malware on computers through e-mail or portable media. We explore commonly 
proposed countermeasures needed to prevent this type of attack, and if any dependencies 
between them exist. Through a combined method approach of surveying the literature and 
conducting semi-structured interviews with domain experts we identified a set of 
countermeasures that provide empirical input for future studies but could potentially also give 
organizations guidance on how to manage social engineering-based malware installation attacks.  
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1. Introduction  
The increased effectiveness and robustness of technical security components has made it more 
difficult to successfully introduce malware on computer systems using purely technical means. 
Many attackers have therefore started to include social means in their malicious efforts and target 
the humans accessing and using the computers (Applegate, 2009). These types of attacks are 
commonly known as social engineering attacks. In organizational settings, typical social 
engineering attacks include deceptive methods to make an organizational member comply with a 
malicious request, e.g. execute malware on a computer or install malware through portable media 
(Mitnick & Simon, 2002). Numerous papers have focused on describing social engineering 
concepts and proposed a plethora of different countermeasure including technical controls, user 
interventions and organizational security policies. However, the effectiveness of these 
approaches has largely remained anecdotal. The existing empirical research has largely focused 
on success rates of certain types of social engineering attacks or analyzing characteristics that 
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influence an individual’s susceptibility to social engineering attacks. In Bakhshi, Papadaki, & 
Furnell (2009) an experiment was conducted in where a phishing mail was sent out to 
organizational employees as a mean to assess the probability of malware being successfully 
installed on their computers. In the study by Pattinson, Jerram, Parsons, McCormac, & 
Butavicius (2012) it was found that familiarity with computers and cognitive impulsivity affected 
an individual’s susceptibility to phishing. These results provide indications of how susceptible an 
organization is to social engineering, but no information is given on how to effectively counter 
these attacks and most importantly, which countermeasures that are effective when employed in 
an organization given different scenarios, i.e., the type of attack they counter. From a 
practitioner’s point of view, it’s challenging to practically assess the effectiveness of 
countermeasures. It is therefore, with no doubt, useful to know if there are countermeasures that 
are more effective than others and if some combinations of countermeasure are better than 
others.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of commonly proposed 
countermeasures against two types of social engineering-based malware installation attacks: 
phishing and malware installation through portable media. To effectively defend against social 
engineering attacks the strategy need to include multiple countermeasures that are structured and 
combined in a holistic approach (Applegate, 2009). We therefore attempt to understand if any 
dependencies between countermeasures exist. We aim to fulfill this purpose through a combined 
method approach in where we first identify relevant countermeasures by performing a literature 
review and then obtain opinions on the perceived effectiveness of the countermeasures by 
conducting semi-structured interviews with domain experts.  
 
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. The next section presents social engineering attacks and 
countermeasures discussed in the literature. The section that follows presents how the data 
collection was conducted in order to obtain a deeper understating of social engineering malware 
installation attacks and countermeasures. Then, the results of the data collection are presented 
and discussed. The final section concludes the paper.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
While there have been many papers describing social engineering and its components in detail 
(e.g. (Applegate, 2009)(Hong, 2012)(Mitnick & Simon, 2002)) there is, to the knowledge of the 
authors, no holistic approach that have examined the effectiveness of countermeasures and their 
potential dependencies, given different scenarios. This section provides a basis for understanding 
the linkages between two social engineering-based malware installation attacks (phishing and 
malware installation through portable media) and countermeasures commonly proposed in the 
literature that will be discussed during the interviews. 
 
2.1 Social engineering-based malware installation attacks 
Phishing is described as the marriage between technology and social engineering in which 
attackers use spoofed email messages to trick end-users into taking a suggested action that 
benefits the attacker (Nohlberg & Kowalski, 2008). For instance, the attacker can convince end-
users to reply with sensitive information such as user credentials or click on a malicious link 
where the attacker either: i) automatically introduce malware by exploiting vulnerabilities in the 
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web browser (e.g. drive by download) or ii) persuade end-users to execute malware on their 
computers. Malware can also be executed through hidden scripts in attached documents. 
Malware installation using portable media is the practice of using a combination of technical 
and social attack methods. For instance, an attacker can send a valuable gift (e.g. an Ipad) to a 
potential victim or leave a USB memory stick with a tempting text, outside a building, to entice a 
victim’s curiosity into using the item in their computer (Nohlberg & Kowalski, 2008).  
 
2.2 Countermeasures 
Countermeasures against social engineering- based malware installation attacks can be 
categorized as organizational security policies, user security interventions and technical controls. 
In the following, countermeasures proposed in the literature are presented. 
 
2.2.1 Organizational security policies  
Organizational security policies are developed and maintained to get employees to perform 
behavior that is conducive to the protection of information assets in the enterprise (A. Da Veiga 
& Eloff, 2010).  
Internet use policy addresses and restricts employee Internet usage (e.g. usage of social network 
sites during work hours) (Hasan & Prajapati, 2009),(A. D. Veiga & Eloff, 2007).  
Acceptable installation policy addresses software installation privileges and restricts additional 
software installation on users’ computers (Nohlberg & Kowalski, 2008).  
Hardware policy addresses the acceptable use and disposal of hardware (e.g. computers, 
portable media) that can contain either sensitive information or malware (Hasan & Prajapati, 
2009). 
Separation of duties policy has the primary objective to prevent that a single deception or 
breach of trust is sufficient to compromise a system. In theory, the policy can prevent an attacker 
from gaining access of information when deceiving one victim as it may require more than one 
victim to deceive for accessing the targeted information. This may discourage the attacker and 
thus lower the probability of success (Nohlberg & Kowalski, 2008),(Botha & Eloff, 2001).  
 
2.2.2 User interventions 
User interventions are often seen as an important to counter social engineering attacks and often 
carried out through formal training, workshops, lectures or through IT-based training tools.  
Awareness education and training program increases the user knowledge of general IT 
security threats and threats related to social engineering malware. Further, the training should 
inform the user on common manipulative techniques and educate the user to recognize and react 
to an attack (Applegate, 2009), (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). 
Verification and authorization procedures educate users that they need verify the identity of 
the person requesting a type of information or action to be taken, and ensure that the person is 
authorized to receive the requested information or giving the order to perform an action (Mitnick 
& Simon, 2002).  
Social engineering penetration tests are important for management to assure and monitor that 
the users have comprehended the security education and training.  This could be done through 
implementing regular security exercises using weaker forms of penetration tests. These exercises 
reinforce the training and education programs. It also keeps the users alert, and more prepared in 
the occasion of an actual attack (Barrett, 2003)(Nohlberg & Kowalski, 2008). 
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2.2.3 Technical controls  
Technical controls are countermeasures that are implemented to block a malicious mail at the 
gateway, prevent a user to browse on malicious web pages, or prevent malware to be installed on 
a computer.  
Sender policy framework works as an email validation system designed to prevent email spam 
by detecting email spoofing by verifying that a sending host is authorized to send mail on behalf 
of the source domain. This measure should make it easier for the human recipient to recognize 
that the sending domain is legitimate for the targeted organization (Tally, Thomas, & Vleck, 
2004),(Milletary, 2005).  
Content-based email filter is a countermeasure that is installed at the company’s network 
boundary (mail gateway). It analyses the e-mail content and prevents phishing e-mail from 
reaching the users and thus stopping the attack at an early stage of the attack (Bergholz, 
2010),(Huang, Tan, & Liu, 2009).   
Blacklist function is a measure that is included in the browser. The browser queries lists of 
blacklisted and whitelisted domains and makes sure that a user is not accessing any malicious 
phishing sites. The blacklist requires active monitoring and needs to be updated on a regular 
basis (Hong, 2012),(Huang et al., 2009). 
 
Little research has been done on the effectiveness of commonly proposed countermeasures 
against social engineering-based malware installation attacks and if there exists potential 
dependencies between those countermeasures. In an attempt towards fulfilling the gap, data was 
collected by interviewing content domain experts. 
 
3. Data collection 
Six semi-structured interviews were utilized in order to capture rich, detailed information on 
content experts’ views of the investigated domain in general, and countermeasures against social 
engineering attacks in particular. The number of respondents was decided due to the following 
reasons: i) the study is of exploratory nature, and ii) a too high number of respondents will make 
thorough interpretations of the interviews difficult (Kvale, 1986). 
 
The interviews were carried out from February 2012 to June 2012. All respondents had acquired 
a deep domain specific knowledge through experience of the topic on a regular basis. Two of the 
respondents were academics, and are both well-regarded in the research field and have many 
years of practical experience. Four respondents were practitioners. They were selected on 
recommendations, and had all worked extensively within the investigated domain. Respondent 
data is summarized in table 1. 
 
Respondent Position Experience (Years) 
 
Time (Hours) 
1 Professor and scientist (private industry) >15 1 
2 Senior Consultant 16 1.5 
3 Consultant 5 1.5 
4 Head of Security (private industry) 12 2.5 
5 Associate professor >10 2 
6 Senior security researcher (private industry) >15 1 
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Table 1: Respondent data 
 
Three of the interviews were carried out face-to-face at the expert’s respective places of business 
and three over telephone due to geographical issues. Due to the complexity of acquiring 
assessment on the effectiveness of the countermeasures effort was spent to enforce reliability of 
results. That is, the original layout and scope of the data collection was somewhat changed 
according to the focus area(s) of the respondents. For example, no answers were forced, the 
scales were allowed to be switched for a ranking system, and the respondents were allowed to 
traverse from the original scope if needed. For example, if they wanted to discuss a particular 
countermeasure in greater detail. As a consequence, more time was spent on those matters the 
respondents perceived to be of greater importance for the topic of the study.  
 
The interviews all had the same general approach, and consisted of three main objectives: (i) to 
gain a deeper understanding of social engineering-based malware installation attacks, (ii) to 
discuss the relevance (if the experts perceived that the countermeasures are not only useful in 
theory but will also possible to implement in practice) and comprehensiveness (if there are any 
countermeasures missing to capture the content domain) of the countermeasures proposed by the 
literature (cf. section 2.2), (iii) to assess the effectiveness of countermeasures that were the 
output of objective (ii) through a scale of 1-5, where 1 meant “do not increase the difficulty of 
successful attack” and 5 “greatly increase the difficulty of successful attack” and (iv) to discuss 
potential relationships between countermeasures, i.e., if the experts perceive that any 
combination of countermeasures provides greater effectiveness, and which combinations that 
they perceive don’t provide any greater effectiveness.  
 
4. Data collection results and discussions 
During the first interview the expert commented on the importance of clearly defining the profile 
of the attacker and to clarify what the attacker wants to obtain by attacking an organization or 
individual, i.e., is the attacker after generic or specific information of an organization. It is 
expected that the effort required to defend against a targeted attack is much higher than for a 
generic attack and the experts therefore perceived that the type of attack affect the effectiveness 
of the countermeasures. Therefore, only when clearly defining the attacker an assessment of 
countermeasure effectiveness can be done. As a consequence effort was spent on clearly defining 
the type of attacker and the type of attack that is performed.  
 
Three categories of attacks were defined: a hyper-targeted attack, a semi-targeted attack or a 
generic attack. In a hyper-targeted attack, the attacker is a professional social engineer with a 
large amount of resources, has spent time preparing the attack and obtained a considerable 
amount of context-specific information that makes the effect of any implemented 
countermeasure rather weak. In a semi-targeted attack, an attacker has obtained some context-
specific information, hasn’t the same amount of resources and don’t spend as much time on 
preparing the attack (the most common attack according to the experts). A generic attack is 
usually carried out be a less professional attacker (also known as “script kiddie”) which uses a 
spam-like approach and relies heavily on publically available automated phishing tools. 
For the purpose of the present study, the attacker was defined as an attacker that is performing a 
semi-targeted attack and has obtained some context-specific information. This definition was 
introduced in the remaining interview sessions.  
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4.1 Opinions on the type of attacks 
The experts agreed that the attack is more likely to be regarded successful if the attack aims to 
compromise a computer from anyone in an organization than a specific piece of information that 
a specific person has access to. For instance, clicking on malicious link can be enough to install 
malware through a drive by download on a randomly chosen user computer. However, if the 
attacker is after a specific piece of information, the specific information owner needs to install 
the malware. This will require a targeted attack where context-specific information needs to be 
obtained. This information can be obtained by gathering information from the target organization 
in the preparation of the attack.  
 
Regarding the two attack types (phishing and malware installation through portable media), the 
experts perceived that they have both the same main purpose – to install malware on a user 
computer. Given the purpose of the study, the experts perceived that it isn’t necessary to have 
two attack types as they both use social and technical means to make users’ install malware on 
their computer and therefore suggested merging these two attack types into one broader attack 
type. Consequently, the two attack types were aggregated to one variable. 
 
4.2 Opinions on the countermeasures 
4.2.1 Opinions on security policies 
A policy that restricts Internet usage is perceived to be difficult to implement in an entire 
organization. Five experts argued that the best way to protect user is to keep them away from 
malware. Therefore it’s suggested that such a policy should be implemented on the computers to 
control the use of browsers versions and websites that employees are allowed to browse. This 
policy works to prevent users form accessing hostile content on the Internet and limit access to 
sites people actually need to access during work hours. The experts recommended replacing the 
Internet use policy with a broader policy denoted as Technology acceptable use policy and also 
include acceptable email usage. 
 
Regarding acceptable installation of additional software the experts suggested that a combination 
of two measures can be used. The first measure can be a written policy that addresses acceptable 
installation of additional software (Acceptable installation policy) and the second 
countermeasure is a policy installed on the computer to Minimize user privileges (the experts 
prescribe the change of Separation of duties policy to the procedure Minimizing user privileges). 
The latter countermeasure both limit users access rights to information that users need in their 
daily work and make it impossible for regular users to install software on their work computers 
without having administrator privileges. The experts further agreed that a policy that addresses 
the acceptable use and disposal of portable media is useful and can be implemented in practice. 
However, they suggested renaming the measure to Device acceptable use policy. 
 
4.2.2 Opinions on user interventions 
Training users to recognize and react to malware attacks is perceived to provide good results. 
However, the experts’ opinions are rather varying. One expert perceived that it’s not useful to 
train users as at least one user will always be fooled by the social engineer and install the 
malware in spite of educational efforts. For instance, this expert believed that if a device is 
desirable enough, the user will connect the device to a computer and thereby install malware. 
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However, the experts agreed that for an attack through portable media, user training is more 
effective than for a phishing attack as they perceive that it’s easier to implement such training in 
practice. Regarding verification procedures, the experts agreed that if the attack is targeted, the 
measure is not effective at all as the attacker will bypass the measure using effective 
manipulative skills. The experts agreed that social engineering penetration tests are well-invested 
efforts if the results are used effectively. The penetration tests assess how well implemented 
measures function and identifies weaknesses in the security defense chain. The tests increase the 
security awareness and make future educational efforts more effective.  
 
Based on the expert recommendations, the measures awareness education and training program 
and verification and authorization procedures was aggregated to User security training. Social 
engineering penetration test was replaced with Performance monitoring.  
 
4.2.3 Opinions on technical countermeasures 
The experts agreed that technical countermeasures are important and should be able to recognize 
if an attached link or software is malicious. The experts suggested three layers of technical 
measures. The first layer prevents a malicious mail from reaching its target. This layer consists 
of parameters related to email protection on a mail server level. Anti-spam technology analyzes 
the structure of an incoming mail at the gateway. Antivirus technology checks for virus 
signatures, content filter analysis the email to identify any suspicious content, and outbreak filter 
analyses the attached link to the website (based on blacklist technology). If the filter doesn’t 
recognize the link to the website, it’s quarantined and scanned for virus and if virus is identified 
the mail is blocked. The experts recommended the countermeasure that prevents a malicious mail 
from reaching its target to be referred as Email protection. 
 
The second layer consists of parameters related to the protection against malware installation on 
a user’s desktop computer. This layer consist of measures such as antivirus, antimalware, content 
filter, outbreak filter and web reputation filter that analyses the IP address to the webserver. If the 
webserver is listed as malicious, the user is not able to browse to the malicious website. The 
experts recommended naming the measure Desktop anti-malware. 
 
The final measure is activated when a user has installed malware on a computer. The measure 
works to monitor and detect malicious outgoing traffic. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) 
usually serve this purpose.  
 
4.2.4 Countermeasures to add according to the experts 
Regarding the comprehensiveness of the countermeasures, the experts recommended to add five 
countermeasures. Intrusion detection system was added to monitor and detect malicious outgoing 
traffic. For data hygiene, two measures were recommended: a formal Patch management process 
that regularly updates used software and a process that monitors the services being used and 
Disable unnecessary services if needed. Thus, minimizing service being used and maximizing 
software updates. A Device control measure was added to handle attempts to install malware 
through portable media. This measure includes virus scanning when the user connects the media 
and that the auto-run function is turned off. The experts finally agreed that Information security 
leadership is very important for effective implementation and manage of all other measures, and 
to get sponsorship for every security effort being made or planned to be made in an organization. 
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4.3 Effectiveness of countermeasures 
The quantitative estimates made by the respondents can be seen in Table 2. These estimates are 
made under the assumption that no measure other than the one studied is present. The 
effectiveness of the measures was studied based on the changes as recommended by the experts 
and their effectiveness against an attacker that is conducting a semi-targeted malware installation 
attack and has obtained some context-specific information. Notable is that the two respondents 
did not feel comfortable providing quantitative estimates of 1-5, they preferred High (H), 
Medium (M), and Low (L) instead. The results point to a consensus regarding most measures. 
There is agreement regarding Information security leadership to be the most effective measure. 
However, the consensus regarding User security training is rather low. The respondents perceive 
it to be important, but the effectiveness depends on the degree of obtained context-information 
that an attacker can use to gain trust.  
 
Attack Countermeasure R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
Malware installation attack Technology acceptable use policy 
(TAUP) 
- 2 2 2 - L 
Acceptable installation policy (AIP) 2 4 4 3 L M 
Device acceptable use policy (DAUP) - 4 4 2 L M 
User security training (UST) 2 4 3 4 H L 
Performance monitoring (Pmon) 2 4 3 3 M L 
Patch management (Pman) - 3 3 3 M H 
Disabling unnecessary services (DUS) - - 2 2 M H 
Minimizing user privileges (MUP) 4 3 - - M H 
Email protection (EP) 3 4 3 4 M M 
Desktop anti-malware (DAM) 4 4 4 4.5 - H 
Intrusion detection system (IDS) 3 3 3 3 - H 
Device control (DC) 3 4 2 4 M - 
Information security leadership (ISL) 5 4 4 4 - - 
 
Table 2: Estimates of the effectiveness of countermeasures 
 
 
 
4.4 Effectiveness of countermeasures in combination 
Oftentimes, the effectiveness of one countermeasure can be thought of as dependent on the 
presence of another. The result of the data collection on this topic is depicted in table 3. A “0“ 
means that the combination of countermeasures is not perceived to result in a significant 
increased effectiveness. A “+” means that the combination is perceived to result in a significantly 
increased effectiveness. A “*” means that a data collection event did not detail the perceived 
dependency between two countermeasures. Interview 1 is the first symbol in each cell, interview 
2 the second, interview 3 the third, and so forth. For example, the combination between 
Acceptable installation policy (AIP) and Performance monitoring (Pmon) has the symbols 
“0+++*+“. That is, respondent 1 (R1) did not perceive the combination to result in any 
significant increased effectiveness, and as such the first symbol is “0“. The second, third, fourth 
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and sixth respondents (R2, R3, R4 and R6) perceived a significant increased effectiveness of the 
combination, and thus the second, third, fourth and sixth symbols are “+”. Finally, the fifth 
respondent did feel comfortable to assess the effectiveness in combination; and thus the fifth 
symbol is“*”. 
 
Some interesting results are now discussed. All experts perceived that Information security 
leadership (ISL) in combination with the other countermeasures increases the effectiveness of the 
protection against malware installation. User security training (UST) is perceived to increase the 
effectiveness in combination with all measures except Patch management (Pman), Disable 
unnecessary services (DUS) and Minimizing user privileges (MUP). This is expected as these 
measures are oftentimes managed by a centralized IT department and do not have a direct 
interaction with the user. However, Email protection (EP) and Desktop-antimalware (DAM) for 
instance, are perceived to have a greater effectiveness in combination with user training. The 
reason for this is that the experts perceived that the technical measures should work to both 
prevent a malicious email from reaching its target and make it impossible for a user to install 
malware on a computer. However, if the mail reaches the user and the computers antimalware is 
not implemented or well-maintained; the training should prevent the user from installing the 
attached malware. Therefore it is believed that these countermeasures, together, make it more 
difficult for an attacker to successfully install malware on a user computer. Device control (DC) 
and Acceptable installation policy (AIP) is perceived to increase the effectiveness in combination 
by five out of six experts. On the other hand, the countermeasure specifically related to malware 
installed using devices is generally not perceived to be effective in combination with measures 
implemented for phishing attacks. The reason behind this is logical and based on the fact that 
these measures are simply not relevant in combination. 
 
In this study we examined the combination of two countermeasures at a time. Examining more 
than two countermeasures at a time would be interesting, although very time consuming, and 
there could be a risk that it would be difficult to assess the effectiveness of more than two 
countermeasures in combination, in particular using human judgment. As the results show, the 
experts in this study perceive that some combinations do not increase the effectiveness in 
combination. Future research could examine if these results hold when collecting data from a 
larger sample. 
 
4.5 Discussions on the interview methodology 
To address bias in this study, the data collection was carried out using the same procedure using 
a structured procedure. Also, no respondent had any previous affiliation with the interviewer. To 
handle the complexity of the research purpose, the questionnaire was broken down into a 
sequence of different topics. The sub-session corresponding to each of these topics were 
introduced by the interviewer at the beginning of each session. Another potential bias is that 
respondents, if pressured, can provide answers which they do not really believe in. This is of 
particular significance to a study such as the present, with complex high-level questions that can 
be perceived as difficult to answer. To counter this issue, no answers were forced. Furthermore, 
the format of the estimates could be changed to better suit the respondent. These options were 
utilized twice in the present study: one respondent did not feel comfortable assessing the 
effectiveness of countermeasures in combination and two respondents did not feel comfortable 
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with the measurement scale of “mean effectiveness”. As a consequence, the interview instrument 
was revised during these occasions to accommodate their needs. 
 
 
 TAUP AIP DAUP UST Pmon Pman DUS MUP EP DAM IDS DC 
AIP 0++***            
DAUP 0000*0 ++++*+           
UST ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+         
 
Pmon 0+++** 0+++*+ 0+++*+ 0+++++         
Pman *****0 **00*0 ***0*0 ***0*0 ***0*0        
DUS ***0*0 ***0*0 ***0*0 ***0*0 ***0*0 ***0*0       
MUP **00*0 ++++*+ ++++*+ **00*0 0000*0 0000*0 00++*+      
EP 0+++*+ 0+++*+ *000** ++++*+ 0++0*+ *****0 **00*0 +**+**     
DAM 0**+** ++++*+ ++++** ++++*+ 0000*0 *+++*+ 0****0 *****0 *+++*+    
IDS 0****0 0**0*0 0**0*0 ++++*+ 0000*0 ***0** *00**0 *00**0 ++++*+ 0+++*+   
DC 0000*0 ++++*+ ++++** ++++*+ 0++**0 0****0 0****0 **+**0 0000*0 ++++*+ 0000*0  
ISL ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ 
 
Table 3: Dependencies between countermeasures. “+”denotes perceived increased effectiveness, 
“0“denotes no perceived increased effectiveness, and “*”denotes that the combination was not 
scored. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this study, we have attempted to obtain a deeper understanding of how to defend against social 
engineering-based malware installation attacks. We have conducted six semi-structured 
interviews with experts to discuss the relevance and comprehensiveness of a set of 
countermeasures that were identified be performing a literature review. Data was then collected 
on the effectiveness of the individual countermeasures that the experts perceived to be relevant 
and if any dependencies between them exist.  
 
The result of the interviews indicates that experts perceive that some countermeasures are more 
important and can be more easily implemented in practice than others. The consensus regarding 
the effectiveness of email protection, desktop anti-malware and intrusion detection system is 
rather high. However, for some countermeasures (e.g. user security training and device control) 
the consensus among the experts regarding the countermeasure effectiveness is rather low. The 
experts perceive that the most important countermeasure is information security leadership as it 
affects the effectiveness of all other countermeasures.  
 
The study is of exploratory nature and as the field is still immature there is still research left to be 
conducted. The results from this study can be seen as hypothetical relations between social 
engineering concepts that can be further validated in future studies. In line with the nature of the 
study we aim at continuing our research by conducting several validation steps. Currently, we are 
conducting several case studies were we are collecting survey data, conducting observations and 
unannounced phishing experiments. Through these studied we will attempt to measure actual 
effectiveness of measures against a social engineering-based malware installation attack. 
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